SYS.TELCOSEC.NET — RESEARCH DIVISION

SYSTEM_STATUS: ONLINE

SECTelcoSec Research

CONSOLE_V4.4 // STATUS: ACTIVE // SESSION:

Global Intelligence Hub for high-fidelity telecom security, signaling research, and collaborative research nodes.

// TELEMETRY_FEED: ALPHA_09 ACTIVE

SCTP_INTERCONNECT:STABLE (0.002% LOSS)

5G_SBA_MESH:mTLS_ENFORCED

CIPHERING_POSTURE:EEA2 / 128-AES

NODE_01

Network Nodes

NODE_02

Threat Vectors

NODE_03

Protocols Mapped

NODE_04

Active Analysts

Network Nodes

Threat Vectors

Protocols Mapped

Active Analysts

LIVE_ALERTS

IMSI CATCHER DETECTED // SECTOR 7 // null_cipheringGTP-U ANOMALY // NODE 44 // latency_spike5G SBA UNTRUSTED ACCESS // AMF_02 // http2_resetSS7 MAP SEND-ROUTING-INFO INTERCEPT // BLOCKEDDIAMETER CLR FRAUD INJECTION // INTERCEPTEDUNAUTHORIZED MIB BROADCAST // BAND 3 // tower_8849ROUTING UPDATE // HLR_01 // secure_handshakeBASEBAND FIRMWARE ATTESTATION MISMATCH // Node_Beta

// KINETIC INTELLIGENCE SUITE

Carrier Telemetry & Command Sandbox

FEED_PROTOCOL: IPX/SBA| NODE ONLINE

CARRIER TELEMETRY STREAM

IMSI_CATCHER_INTERCEPT

LTE RRC / NAS

Null Ciphering Detected // Tower_ID: 8849

T-MINUS 00:02:14

GTP-U_TUNNEL_LEAK

GTP-U / User Plane

Anomalous Packet Routing // Node_Alpha

T-MINUS 00:08:42

5G_SBA_ROGUE_NF

5G SBA HTTP/2 JSON

Unauthorized NRF Registration // AMF_02

T-MINUS 00:15:33

SS7_LOCATION_TRACKING

SS7 MAP v3

SendRoutingInfoForSM Flooding // HLR_01

T-MINUS 00:23:09

telcosec-cli // root@intel-node

$ telcosec-cli --scan ran-interface --target mobile-01

[SYSTEM] Initializing SDR RF-frontend (USRP B210 @ 1.8GHz)...

[SYSTEM] Synchronizing with primary synchronization signal (PSS/SSS)...

[SYSTEM] Decoding Master Information Block (MIB) on Band 3...

[ALERT] Unauthorized secondary broadcast detected // CellID: 0x4B21

[VULN] Null ciphering (EEA0) advertised on downstream carrier

>> SCAN COMPLETE: 1 rogue transmitter isolated

EXPLORE ENGINEERING TOOLS SUITE→

LATEST INTELLIGENCE

ACCESS FEED

5G SBA NRF OAuth2 Token Abuse and NF Impersonation

core attacks

HIGH

5G SBA NRF OAuth2 Token Abuse and NF Impersonation

How rogue NFs abuse missing NF Instance ID binding in NRF OAuth2 token issuance to impersonate AMF/UDM and exfiltrate 5G core subscriber data.

core attacks

5G SEPP N32 Roaming Interface Security Bypass

2026-07-04MEDIUM

transmissions attacks

5G SUCI Null-Scheme Attacks: The IMSI Catcher Evolution

2026-07-04HIGH

CORE CAPABILITIES

> scanning 10.0.88.0/24 :: port 2905

[✓] STP node found: stp-eu01.ss7.carrier.net

[!] MAP SRI-SM exposed on SCCP GT +4412...

VULN SCAN :: 01

Protocol Fingerprinting

Deep packet inspection and state-machine analysis across GPRS, UMTS, LTE, and 5G signaling stacks.

SS7DIAMETERHTTP/2

> rdnsx --target epc.mno.net --fuzz

[▶] GTP-C teardown injected on tunnel 0x4A

[✗] Session hijack: TEID collision confirmed

ADVERSARY :: 02

Offensive Validation

Controlled adversarial simulations for RAN air-interface, network slicing, and multi-access edge computing.

SDRO-RANEXPLOIT

> verify sepp --interface N32 --mtls

[✓] TLS 1.3 :: ECDHE-AESGCM-256 active

[✓] OAuth2 token scope validation passed

DEF ARCH :: 03

Hardened Architecture

Zero-trust blueprints and cryptographic verification schemas for cloud-native core network deployments.

CRYPTOSBAZTA

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AUDIT SURFACE MAP

LAYER_01HIGH RISK

5G Core / SBA

REST API fuzzing, NRF token leakage, SEPP bypass, slice isolation

LAYER_02CRITICAL

Signaling Plane

SS7 MAP tracking, Diameter billing fraud, GTP-C session hijacking

LAYER_03CRITICAL

Radio Access Network

IMSI catchers, baseband 0-days, downgrade attacks, O-RAN fronthaul

STANDARDS :: 3GPP TS 33.x / GSMA FS.11 / FS.19

TelcoSec researchers leverage custom-built SDR stacks, protocol fuzzers, and signaling testbeds to simulate real-world attacks. Every reported vulnerability is verified, reproducible, and mapped directly to 3GPP and GSMA standards — not derived from conventional IT scanners.

KEY RESEARCH LINKS

► IMSI Catchers & Rogue Base Stations ► Baseband Exploitation ► SS7 MAP Vulnerabilities ► Diameter Protocol Security ► Vulnerabilities in 5G SBA ► RAN Air Interface Threats

Coordinated disclosure cycles with global MNOs, equipment vendors, and regulatory bodies ensure vulnerabilities are remediated before active exploitation in production networks.

THREAT INTELLIGENCE STREAM